Chen, Kebing; Xiao, Tiaojun Reordering policy and coordination of a supply chain with a loss-averse retailer. (English) Zbl 1276.90032 J. Ind. Manag. Optim. 9, No. 4, 827-853 (2013). Summary: This paper develops three (re)ordering models of a supply chain consisting of one risk-neutral manufacturer and one loss-averse retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effects of the reordering policy on the coordination mechanism. The three (re)ordering policies are twice ordering policy with break-even quantity, twice ordering policy without break-even quantity and once ordering policy, respectively. We design a buyback-setup-cost-sharing mechanism to coordinate the supply chain for each policy, and Pareto analysis indicates that both the manufacturer and the retailer will realize a ‘win-win’ situation. By comparing the models, we find that twice ordering policy with break-even quantity is absolutely dominant for both the retailer and the supply chain. However, only if the break-even quantity is less than the mean quantity to failure, twice ordering policy without break-even quantity is dominant over the once ordering policy. The higher marginal revenue can induce more order quantity of the retailer under both twice ordering policy with break-even quantity and once ordering policy. However, it is interesting that it has no effect on the order plan of centralized decision-maker in twice ordering policy without break-even quantity. Cited in 3 Documents MSC: 90B50 Management decision making, including multiple objectives 91B06 Decision theory 91A10 Noncooperative games Keywords:supply chain management; channel coordination; newsvendor model; game theory; buyback contract PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Chen} and \textit{T. Xiao}, J. Ind. Manag. Optim. 9, No. 4, 827--853 (2013; Zbl 1276.90032) Full Text: DOI