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Frege and other philosophers. (English) Zbl 0981.03009

Oxford: Clarendon Press. xiv, 330 p. (1996).
This is the paperback edition of Michael Dummett’s classical collection of essays, first published in 1991 [Oxford University Press, Oxford]. These essays can be seen as a response to Hans D. Sluga’s severe attack against the ahistoric approach in M. Dummett’s book on Frege’s philosophy of language [Frege: Philosophy of language, Duckworth, London (1973)]. See, e.g., H. D. Sluga’s book “Gottlob Frege” [Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley (1980; Zbl 0488.03003)]. Although Dummett still believes, “that the most significant connections were between Frege and later philosophers, not between him and his contemporaries or predecessors, who had contributed little to the formation of his most important ideas” (p.vii), he now accepts that only against the setting of the ideas of contemporary philosophy it is possible to understand “what Frege regarded it as necessary to argue against and why he expressed himself as he did” (p.viii).
The volume contains the following essays: 1. “Frege on the consistency of mathematical theories” (pp.1-16) compares the concepts of consistency by Frege and Hilbert. 2. “Frege and the paradox of analysis” (pp.17-52) discusses the affection of Frege’s notion of analysis by G. E. Moore’s paradox of analysis. 3. This joint paper with S. A. Adeleke and P. M. Neumann “On a question of Frege’s about right-ordered groups” (pp.53-64) gives a mathematical discussion of a group-theoretical independence problem posed by Frege in the third part of his “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” (Vol. II, 1903). This contribution is based on a paper published in 1987 [Bull. Lond. Math. Soc. 19, 513-521 (1987; Zbl 0632.06022)]. 4. “Frege’s ‘Kernsätze zur Logik’ ” (pp.65-78) gives a suggestion for dating the posthumous “Kernsätze zur Logik”, which has in the meantime convincingly be criticized by Frans Hovens [Hist. Philos. Log. 18, No. 1, 17-31 (1997; Zbl 0880.01005)]. 5. “Frege as a realist” (pp.79-96) contains Dummett’s response to Sluga’s arguments against Frege’s realism and the eminent role of the context principle. 6. “Objectivity and reality in Lotze and Frege” (pp.97-125) discusses critically Sluga’s thesis that Hermann Lotze had a significant influence on Frege, especially by comparing Frege and Lotze’s notions of objectivity and reality. 7. “Frege and Kant on geometry” (pp.126-157) compares Frege and Kant’s opinions concerning the foundations of geometry, especially criticizing Sluga’s claim that Frege held the Kantian thesis of space and time as a priori intuitions. 8. “An unsuccessful dig” (pp.158-198) reprints the detailed, but disparaging review of the Wittgenstein scholars G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker’s book “Frege: Logical excavations” [Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York (1984)]. 9. The “Second thoughts” (pp.199-216) concern Baker and Hacker’s reply. 10. “Which end of the telescope” (pp.217-236) contains a reply to some criticism of Stuart Shanker against Dummett’s interpretation of Frege’s philosophy, i.e. a criticism from a Wittgensteinian perspective. 11. “Frege and Wittgenstein” (pp.237-248) provides a critical examination of Wittgenstein’s interpretation of Frege’s philosophy. 12. “Frege’s myth of the third realm” (pp.249-262) deals with Frege’s theory of reference [for the original see Unters. Logik Methodol. 3, 24-38 (1986; Zbl 0622.03005)]. 13. “Thought and perception: the views of two philosophical innovators” (pp.263-288) relates Frege’s philosophy to the psychologies of Brentano and Husserl. 14. “More about thoughts” (pp.289-314) discusses David Bell’s theory of thought as related to Frege. 15. “The relative priority of thought and language” (pp.315-324) gives comments on some recent theories in the philosophy of language as related to Frege.

MSC:

03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
01A75 Collected or selected works; reprintings or translations of classics
03-03 History of mathematical logic and foundations
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