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Was Gödel a Gödelian Platonist? (English)

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The author reviews various senses in which Gödel deployed words such as ‘intuition’ and ‘analytic’, as part of Gödel’s claim that the mind is not mechanistic. The author rightly rejects the interpretation of Gödel’s stance as ‘metaphorical Platonism’, where the analogy over existence between mathematical and physical objects is strongly pressed (p. 344).

Ivor Grattan-Guinness (Benigeo/Herts)

Classification :

*01A60 Mathematics in the 20th century

03-03 Historical (mathematical logic)

00A30 Philosophy of mathematics