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On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information. (English) Zbl 1211.91014

Summary: An information structure in a non-cooperative game determines the signal that each player observes as a function of the strategy profile. Such information structure is called non-manipulable if no player can gain new information by changing his strategy. A Conjectural Equilibrium (CE) with respect to a given information structure is a strategy profile in which each player plays a best response to his conjecture about his opponents’ play and his conjecture is not contradicted by the signal he observes. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of pure CE in games with a non-manipulable information structure. We then apply this condition to prove existence of pure CE in two classes of games when the information that players have is the distribution of strategies in the population.

MSC:

91A10 Noncooperative games
91A06 \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\)
91B44 Economics of information
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