Sotomayor, Marilda A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers. (English) Zbl 1082.91005 Int. J. Game Theory 31, No. 2, 269-283 (2002). Summary: A labor market where firms and workers are heterogeneous and may form more than one partnership is considered. A natural concept of core for such markets, different from the concept used by G. L. Thompson [Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 174, 312–334 (1980; Zbl 0448.90004 )], is defined. We show that the core is non-empty and is, in general, strictly greater than Thompson’s core. Unlike Thompson, we found several dissimilarities between our model and the well known one-to-one case studied in L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik [Int. J. Game Theory 1, 111–130 (1971; Zbl 0236.90078)]. Cited in 16 Documents MSC: 91A05 2-person games 91B40 Labor market, contracts (MSC2010) 91B68 Matching models Keywords:stable payoff; core; optimal stable payoffs Citations:Zbl 0448.90004; Zbl 0236.90078 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Sotomayor}, Int. J. Game Theory 31, No. 2, 269--283 (2002; Zbl 1082.91005) Full Text: DOI