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On authority distributions in organizations: Controls. (English) Zbl 1071.91006

In a complex organization, commands can be passed or implemented through the command channels. This paper sets up a framework for organizational control where a group of players can implement indirect commands over other players and the authors investigate three related forms of command channels along with their contexts. In the stricter form, a coalition has the complete power over a player which is found in the military, a slavery as well as private property right. The other two equivalent forms analyze the sharing power over commonly owned property. They can explain issues such as the controlling power, responsibility, democracy in instituting governments, sharing sovereign and indivisible common property. See also the related work by X. Hu and L. S. Shapley [Games Econ. Behav. 45, 132–152 (2003; Zbl 1054.91011)].

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games
91B12 Voting theory

Citations:

Zbl 1054.91011
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Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Hu, X., 2000. Authority distributions and interactions in irreducible organizations. PhD thesis. UCLA; Hu, X., 2000. Authority distributions and interactions in irreducible organizations. PhD thesis. UCLA
[2] Hu, X.; Shapley, L. S., On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium, Games Econ. Behav, 45, 132-152 (2003) · Zbl 1054.91011
[3] Shapley, L.S., 1994. A boolean model of organization based on the theory of simple games. Mimeo; Shapley, L.S., 1994. A boolean model of organization based on the theory of simple games. Mimeo
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