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Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies. (English) Zbl 0889.92019

Summary: In game-theoretic or strategic models of species evolution, the phenotypes of individual organisms in a population are regarded as alternate strategies for playing a competitive game. The evolutionary outcome is predicted to conform to the “solution” of that game. The most usual solution concept adopted for the evolutionary game is that of J. Maynard Smith [Evolution and the theory of games. (1982); see also Proc. R. Soc. Lond., Ser. B 219, 315-325 (1983; Zbl 0531.92015)], the so-called “evolutionary stable strategies” (ESS).
We explore an alternative solution concept. We call it neighborhood invader strategy (NIS). A NIS is a phenotype which is capable of invading all established populations of its neighbors. This phenotype need not be, at the same time, an ESS; and the reverse is true as well. We shall analyze this concept for a single species whose evolutionary-possibility set is a one-dimensional continuum.

MSC:

92D15 Problems related to evolution
91A40 Other game-theoretic models

Citations:

Zbl 0531.92015
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