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On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser. (English) Zbl 0769.90026

Summary: We investigate the propensity of some simple voting systems to elect the Condorcet loser in three-alternative elections. Exact relations are obtained which give the probability of this paradox for plurality and negative voting as a function of the number of voters. Moreover, we show that, if preferences are single-peaked, then the Condorcet loser election is much less frequent with approval voting than with plurality voting.

MSC:

91B12 Voting theory
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