Myerson, Roger B.; Satterthwaite, Mark A. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. (English) Zbl 0523.90099 J. Econ. Theory 29, 265-281 (1983). Page: −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 ±0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Show Scanned Page Cited in 16 ReviewsCited in 270 Documents MSC: 91A12 Cooperative games Keywords:bargaining; one buyer; one seller; single object; allocation mechanisms; Bayesian incentive compatibility PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. B. Myerson} and \textit{M. A. Satterthwaite}, J. Econ. Theory 29, 265--281 (1983; Zbl 0523.90099) Full Text: DOI Link References: [1] Chatterjee, K., Incentive compatibility in bargaining under uncertainty (1980), Pennsylvania State University, To appear in Quarterly Journal of Economics [2] Chatterjee, K.; Samuelson, W., The Simple Economics of Bargaining (1979), Pennsylvania State University and Boston University, To appear in Operations Research [3] D’Aspremont, C.; Gerard-Varet, L., Incentives and incomplete information, J. Pub. Econom., 11, 25-45 (1979) [4] Laffont, J.-J; Maskin, E., A differential approach to expected utility maximizing mechanisms, (Laffont, J.-J, Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences (1979), North-Holland: North-Holland Amsterdam), 289-308 [5] Myerson, R. B., Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica, 47, 61-73 (1979) · Zbl 0399.90008 [6] Myerson, R. B., Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res., 6, 58-73 (1981) · Zbl 0496.90099 [7] Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, J. Finance, 16, 8-37 (1961) This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.