id: 01163376
dt: a
an: 01163376
au: Nute, Donald
ti: Apparent obligation.
so: Nute, Donald (ed.), Defeasible deontic logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
    Publishers. Synth. Libr. 263, 287-315 (1997).
py: 1997
pu: Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
la: EN
cc: 
ut: defeasibility; prima facie obligations; deontic logic; defeasible reasoning
ci: Zbl 0787.03018
li: 
ab: The author applies to deontic logic the general approach to defeasible
    reasoning that he has developed in previous publications [e.g. “Basic
    defeasible logic”, in: L. Fariñas del Cerro and M. Penttonen (eds.),
    Intensional logics for programming, Stud. Logic Comput. 1, 125-154
    (1992; Zbl 0787.03018)]. While so doing, he refines a well-known
    distinction between obligations that are prima facie, in the sense of
    applying “other things being equal”, and those that are
    “actual”, in the sense of applying “all things considered”.
    Between these two he suggests a middle category: those that hold
    “given all that we know”. These may come closer to prima facie or
    to actual obligation, depending on how much we know.
rv: D.Makinson (Ville d’Avray)