id: 05823415
dt: a
an: 05823415
au: Buchmann, Johannes; Bulygin, Stanislav; Ding, Jintai; Mohamed, Wael Said
    Abd Elmageed; Werner, Fabian
ti: Practical algebraic cryptanalysis for dragon-based cryptosystems.
so: Heng, Swee-Huay (ed.) et al., Cryptology and network security. 9th
    international conference, CANS 2010, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December
    12‒14, 2010. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN
    978-3-642-17618-0/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6467, 140-155
    (2010).
py: 2010
pu: Berlin: Springer
la: EN
cc: 
ut: 
ci: 
li: doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_11
ab: Summary: Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based
    public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes.
    In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little
    Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this
    paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL
    algorithm and Ding’s concept of Mutants, is able to break Little
    Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys
    of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the
    proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant
    concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show
    that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the
    Magma’s implementation of F4.
rv: