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<item>
  <id>05850285</id>
  <dt>a</dt>
  <an>05850285</an>
  <augroup>
    <au>Lassiter, Daniel</au>
  </augroup>
  <ti>Vagueness as probabilistic linguistic knowledge.</ti>
  <so>Nouwen, Rick (ed.) et al., Vagueness in communication. International workshop, ViC 2009, held as part of ESSLLI 2009, Bordeaux, France, July 20--24, 2009. Revised selected papers. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-18445-1/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6517. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 127-150 (2011).</so>
  <py>2011</py>
  <pu>Berlin: Springer</pu>
  <lagroup>
    <la>EN</la>
  </lagroup>
  <ccgroup>
  </ccgroup>
  <utgroup>
    <ut>vagueness</ut>
    <ut>probability</ut>
    <ut>lexical representation</ut>
    <ut>higher-order vagueness</ut>
  </utgroup>
  <cigroup>
  </cigroup>
  <ligroup>
    <li>doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18446-8_8</li>
  </ligroup>
  <abgroup>
    <ab>Summary: Consideration of the metalinguistic effects of utterances involving vague terms has led Barker [1] to treat vagueness using a modified Stalnakerian model of assertion. I present a sorites-like puzzle for factual beliefs in the standard Stalnakerian model [28] and show that it can be resolved by enriching the model to make use of probabilistic belief spaces. An analogous problem arises for metalinguistic information in Barker's model, and I suggest that a similar enrichment is needed here as well. The result is a probabilistic theory of linguistic representation that retains a classical metalanguage but avoids the undesirable divorce between meaning and use inherent in the epistemic theory [34]. I also show that the probabilistic approach provides a plausible account of the sorites paradox and higher-order vagueness and that it fares well empirically and conceptually in comparison to leading competitors.</ab>
    <rv></rv>
  </abgroup>
</item>