05264259

j

05264259 Bu, Tian-Ming Qi, Qi Sun, Aries Wei Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints. Theor. Comput. Sci. 393, No. 1-3, 1-13 (2008). 2008 Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam EN unconditional competitive auction copy and budget constraints auctioneer-advantaged mechanism Nash equilibrium

doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2007.10.040

Summary: This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. This new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Supposing all participators are rational, how does one allocate the objects and at what price so as to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. We introduce new kinds of mechanisms called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms is that each bidder's self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.