id: 05948151
dt: a
an: 05948151
au: Yoneyama, Kazuki; Zhao, Yunlei
ti: Taxonomical security consideration of authenticated key exchange resilient
    to intermediate computation leakage.
so: Boyen, Xavier (ed.) et al., Provable security. 5th international
    conference, ProvSec 2011, Xi’an, China, October 16‒18, 2011.
    Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-24315-8/pbk). Lecture
    Notes in Computer Science 6980, 348-365 (2011).
py: 2011
pu: Berlin: Springer
la: EN
cc: 
ut: authenticated key exchange; intermediate computation leakage; seCK model;
    Diffie-Hellman
ci: 
li: doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_25
ab: Summary: SMQV authenticated key exchange scheme was stated to be secure
    against leakage of intermediate computations, i.e., secure in the seCK
    model. However, in this paper, we show errors in the security proof of
    SMQV. The found errors proceed from a failure in a simulation of
    leakage of intermediate computations. Moreover, we identify flaws in
    the security proofs of the underlying building tools of both SMQV and
    FHMQV, showing that both SMQV and FHMQV are not proven secure even in
    the traditional CK model. Then, we consider the cause of difficulty to
    prove security in the seCK model and classify previous Diffie-Hellman
    type authenticated key exchange schemes in the sense of achievable
    security levels. As a result, unfortunately, known schemes fall into
    hard to prove or insecure. Accordingly, we suggest that Diffie-Hellman
    type schemes provably secure in the seCK model are hard (or highly
    subtle) to achieve. Therefore, this paper clarifies the technical
    limitations (or high subtleties) of Diffie-Hellman type schemes for
    achieving provable security in the seCK model against leakage of
    intermediate computations.
rv: