id: 05973848
dt: j
an: 05973848
au: Bier, Vicki M.; Haphuriwat, Naraphorn
ti: Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S.
    ports to deter terrorist attacks.
so: Ann. Oper. Res. 187, 137-158 (2011).
py: 2011
pu: Springer, Dordrecht
la: EN
cc: 
ut: port security; cargo screening; game theory; deterrence; decision analysis;
    smuggling of weapons
ci: 
li: doi:10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6
ab: Summary: We investigate how many containers would need to be screened in
    order to deter attackers from attempting to smuggle weapons into a
    defending country in container freight. We hypothesize that with a
    sufficiently high probability of being detected, attackers might be
    deterred from smuggling attempts. Thus, our goal is to identify the
    optimal proportion of containers to inspect in order to minimize the
    defender’s expected loss, using game theory to reflect the fact that
    attackers are simultaneously trying to maximize their expected rewards.
    Moreover, our model recognizes that the container-screening policy must
    simultaneously protect against different types of threats (such as
    nuclear bombs, dirty bombs, and assault rifles). Finally, our model
    also suggests that threatening to retaliate against attacks may be
    beneficial to defenders, as long as the threat is credible.
rv: