@article {IOPORT.05589644,
    author       = {Zhong, Sheng},
    title        = {On distributed $k$-anonymization.},
    year         = {2009},
    journal      = {Fundamenta Informaticae},
    volume       = {92},
    number       = {4},
    issn         = {0169-2968},
    pages        = {411-431},
    publisher    = {Polish Mathematical Society, Warsaw; IOS Press, Amsterdam},
    abstract     = {Summary: When a database owner needs to disclose her data, she can $k$-anonymize her data to protect the involved individuals' privacy. However, if the data is distributed between two owners, then it is an open question whether the two owners can jointly $k$-anonymize the union of their data, such that the information suppressed in one owner's data is not revealed to the other owner. In this paper, we study this problemof distributed $k$-anonymization. We have two major results: First, it is impossible to design an unconditionally private protocol that implements any normal $k$-anonymization function, where normal $k$-anonymization functions are a very broad class of $k$-anonymization functions. Second, we give an efficent protocol that implements a normal $k$-anonymization function and show that it is private against polynomial-time adversaries. Our results have many potential applications and can be extended to three or more parties.},
    identifier   = {05589644},
}