@article {IOPORT.05705233,
    author       = {Heylen, Jan},
    title        = {Carnap's theory of descriptions and its problems.},
    year         = {2010},
    journal      = {Studia Logica},
    volume       = {94},
    number       = {3},
    issn         = {0039-3215},
    pages        = {355-380},
    publisher    = {Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw; Springer, Dordrecht},
    doi          = {10.1007/s11225-010-9243-9},
    abstract     = {{\it R. Carnap} offered, e.g.\ in his [Meaning and necessity. A study in semantics and modal logic. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1947; Zbl 0034.00106)], not only a first-order modal logic, but also a theory of descriptions in its context. Unfortunately he chose, without explanation, two critical restrictions to the form of descriptions. Using self-predication principles, i.e.\ principles of the form $\phi(\iota{x}\phi(x))$ for suitably chosen formulas $\phi$, the author critically discusses previous approaches of {\it D. F{\o}llesdal} [Referential opacity and modal logic. London: Routledge (2004; Zbl 1118.03301)] and {\it G. Mart\'{\i}} [J. Philos. Log. 23, No. 6, 575--593 (1994; Zbl 0812.03006)] to give the explanations which are missing in Carnap's presentation. He argues that Mart\'{\i}'s solution of the problem is inadequate, and that F{\o}llesdal's arguments partly fail, but can suitably be relaxed. However, also this author argues that Carnap's theory of descriptions is inadequate in dealing with improper descriptions.},
    reviewer     = {Siegfried J. Gottwald (Leipzig)},
    identifier   = {05705233},
}