id: 06046304
dt: j
an: 06046304
au: Scrimali, Laura
ti: Pollution control quasi-equilibrium problems with joint implementation of
environmental projects.
so: Appl. Math. Lett. 25, No. 3, 385-392 (2012).
py: 2012
pu: Elsevier Science Ltd. (Pergamon), Oxford
la: EN
cc:
ut: evolutionary quasi-variational inequality; equilibrium conditions; Kyoto
protocol
ci:
li: doi:10.1016/j.aml.2011.09.019
ab: Summary: We show how one of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, the so-called
joint implementation in environmental projects, can be transformed into
and studied as an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality.
Specifically, we examine the situation in which different countries
attempt to fulfill Kyoto commitments by investing in emission reduction
or emission removal projects in countries where the abatement costs are
lower. We derive the equilibrium conditions and prove their
characterization in terms of an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational
inequality problem. Finally, we discuss the existence of solutions.
rv: