@inbook {IOPORT.02131737,
    author       = {Stirling, Wynn C. and Goodrich, Michael A. and Packard, Dennis J.},
    title        = {Satisficing equilibria.},
    year         = {2002},
    booktitle    = {Game theory and decision theory in agent-based systems. Collected papers of the workshops on game theoretic and decision theoretic (GTDT) agents.},
    isbn         = {1-4020-7115-9},
    pages        = {235-265},
    publisher    = {Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers},
    abstract     = {Summary: Satisficing, or being ``good enough,'' is the fundamental obligation of rational decision makers. An operational definition of what it means to be good enough is a prerequisite for making rational choices. In a departure from the traditional notion of satisficing as a species of bounded rationality, satisficing is here redefined in terms of a notion of intrinsic rationality. Epistemic utility theory serves as the philosophical foundation of a new praxeological decision-making paradigm of satisficing equilibria that is applicable to both single- and multiple-agent scenarios. All interagent relationships are modeled by an interdependence function that explicitly accommodates both self and group interest, from which multilateral and unilateral selectability and rejectability mass functions can be derived and compared via the praxeic likelihood ratio test.},
    identifier   = {02131737},
}