@article {IOPORT.02150755,
    author       = {Ketland, Jeffrey},
    title        = {Bueno and Colyvan on Yablo's paradox.},
    year         = {2004},
    journal      = {Analysis},
    volume       = {64},
    number       = {2},
    issn         = {0003-2638},
    pages        = {165-172},
    publisher    = {Oxford University Press, Oxford},
    doi          = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00479.x},
    abstract     = {Introduction: Yablo's paradox [{\it S. Yablo}, ibid. 53, 251--252 (1993; Zbl 0943.03565)] involves a denumerable sequence $Y_i$ of sentences, with the following truth conditions: $$\align Y_0:\quad &\text {For all }n>0,\ Y_n\text{ is not true}.\\ Y_1:\quad & \text{For all }n>1,\ Y_n\text{ is not true}.\\ & \text{etc.}\endalign$$ Unlike the paradoxicality of the strengthened liar sentence, the paradoxicality of this infinite list of `Yablo sentences' is not at all straightforward. In the author's forthcoming paper [``Yablo's paradox and $\omega$-inconsistency'', Synthese (to appear)], it is shown that the list of Yablo sentences is not formally inconsistent. More precisely, the list of `Yablo biconditionals' (all instances of `$Y_n\leftrightarrow\forall m>n$, $Y_m$ is not true') is not inconsistent with the relevant local disquotation principle (all instances of `$Y_n$ is true $\leftrightarrow Y_n$'). Rather, the combination is $\omega$-inconsistent. Furthermore, with an appropriate definition of the extension of `true', it is possible to satisfy this combination on any nonstandard model of arithmetic. So, in a sense, Yablo's paradox is not a genuine paradox. Rather, it is an `$\omega$-paradox', an infinite set of sentences which is unsatisfiable on the standard model of arithmetic. The paper mentioned in the title is the following one: {\it O. Bueno} and {\it M. Colyvan}, Analysis, Oxf. 63, 152--156 (2003; Zbl 1038.03005).},
    identifier   = {02150755},
}