New impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia. (English)
Lin, Dongdai (ed.) et al., Cryptology and network security. 10th international conference, CANS 2011, Sanya, China, December 10‒12, 2011. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-25512-0/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7092, 26-39 (2011).
Summary: Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. This paper introduces a 7-round impossible differential of Camellia including FL/FL$^{ - 1}$ layer. Utilizing impossible differential attack, 10-round Camellia-128 is breakable with $2^{118.5}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{123.5}$ 10 round encryptions. Moreover, 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 can also be analyzed, the time complexity are about $2^{130.4}$ and $2^{194.5}$, respectively. Comparing with known attacks on reduced round Camellia including FL/FL$^{ - 1}$ layer, our results are better than all of them.
Start
Contact
Print
General Help
