id: 05148543
dt: a
an: 05148543
au: Saxena, Nitesh
ti: Public key cryptography sans certificates in ad hoc networks.
so: Zhou, Jianying (ed.) et al., Applied cryptography and network security. 4th
    international conference, ACNS 2006, Singapore, June 6‒9, 2006.
    Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 3-540-34703-8/pbk). Lecture Notes
    in Computer Science 3989, 375-389 (2006).
py: 2006
pu: Berlin: Springer
la: EN
cc: 
ut: 
ci: 
li: doi:10.1007/11767480
ab: Summary: Several researchers have proposed the use of threshold
    cryptographic model to enable secure communication in ad hoc networks
    without the need of a trusted center. In this model, the system remains
    secure even in the presence of a certain threshold $t$ of
    corrupted/malicious nodes. In this paper, we show how to perform
    necessary public key operations without node-specific certificates in
    ad hoc networks. These operations include pair-wise key establishment,
    signing, and encryption. We achieve this by using Feldman’s
    verifiable polynomial secret sharing (VSS) as a key distribution scheme
    and treating the secret shares as the private keys. Unlike in the
    standard public key cryptography, where entities have independent
    private/public key pairs, in the proposed scheme the private keys are
    related (they are points on a polynomial of degree $t)$ and each public
    key can be computed from the public VSS information and node
    identifier. We show that such related keys can still be securely used
    for standard signature and encryption operations (using resp. Schnorr
    signatures and ElGamal encryption) and for pairwise key establishment,
    as long as there are no more that $t$ collusions/corruptions in the
    system. The proposed usage of shares as private keys can also be viewed
    as a threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem under standard
    (discrete logarithm based) assumptions.
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