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<item>
  <id>05289052</id>
  <dt>a</dt>
  <an>05289052</an>
  <augroup>
    <au>Shaked, Yaniv</au>
    <au>Wool, Avishai</au>
  </augroup>
  <ti>Cryptanalysis of the bluetooth $E_{0}$ cipher using OBDD's.</ti>
  <so>Katsikas, Sokratis K. (ed.) et al., Information security. 9th international conference, ISC 2006, Samos Island, Greece, August 30--September 2, 2006. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-540-38341-3/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4176, 187-202 (2006).</so>
  <py>2006</py>
  <pu>Berlin: Springer</pu>
  <lagroup>
    <la>EN</la>
  </lagroup>
  <ccgroup>
  </ccgroup>
  <utgroup>
    <ut>Stream cipher</ut>
    <ut>Cryptanalysis</ut>
    <ut>Bluetooth</ut>
    <ut>BDD</ut>
  </utgroup>
  <cigroup>
  </cigroup>
  <ligroup>
    <li>doi:10.1007/11836810_14</li>
  </ligroup>
  <abgroup>
    <ab>Summary: In this paper we analyze the $E_{0}$ cipher, which is the cipher used in the Bluetooth specifications. We adapted and optimized the Binary Decision Diagram attack of Krause, for the specific details of $E_{0}$. Our method requires 128 known bits of the keystream in order to recover the initial value of the four LFSR's in the $E_{0}$ system. We describe several variants which we built to lower the complexity of the attack. We evaluated our attack against the real (non-reduced) $E_{0}$ cipher. Our best attack can recover the initial value of the four LFSR's, for the first time, with a realistic space complexity of $2^{23}$ (84MB RAM), and with a time complexity of $2^{87}$. This attack can be massively parallelized to lower the overall time complexity. Beyond the specifics of $E_{0}$, our work describes practical experience with BDD-based cryptanalysis, which so far has mostly been a theoretical concept.</ab>
    <rv></rv>
  </abgroup>
</item>